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Abstract Integrated Assessment Models (IAMS) have helped us over the past
decade to understand the interactions between the environment and the economy
in the context of climate change. Although it has also long been recognized that
adaptation is a powerful and necessary tool to combat the adverse effects of climate
change, most IAMS have not explicitly included the option of adaptation in com-
bating climate change. This paper adds to the IAM and climate change literature by
explicitly including adaptation in an IAM, thereby making the trade-offs between
adaptation and mitigation visible. Specifically, a theoretical framework is created
and used to implement adaptation as a decision variable into the DICE model. We
use our new AD-DICE model to derive the adaptation cost functions implicit in the
DICE model. In our set-up, adaptation and mitigation decisions are separable and
AD-DICE can mimic DICE when adaptation is optimal. We find that our specifica-
tion of the adaptation costs is robust with respect to the mitigation policy scenarios
and parameter values. Our numerical results show that adaptation is a powerful
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option to combat climate change, as it reduces most of the potential costs of climate
change in earlier periods, while mitigation does so in later periods.
1 Introduction
Climate change poses one of the biggest global environmental threats for current
and even more so for future generations. There is a scientific consensus that human
activities, through which greenhouse gases are emitted into the atmosphere, are
changing our climate (IPCC 2001a). Greenhouse gases have accumulated in the
atmosphere for centuries and the decay of most greenhouse gases takes more than
50 years. Therefore, the climate change problem will persist for at least the next
century. Climate change is expected to do damages to the economy, with estimates
of, on average, 2% of GDP (IPCC 2001b) by 2100 and perhaps much higher damages
after that.
Consequently, it is important to design efficient long-term climate policies. There
are two main options that a nation has in addressing climate change. Firstly it can try
to limit climate change by reducing its greenhouse gas emissions or exploiting carbon
sinks. This is referred to as mitigation. The other option is adaptation. Adaptation
refers to adjustments in ecological, social or economic systems to moderate potential
damages or to benefit from opportunities associated with climate change (Smit and
Pilifosova 2001). Examples of adaptation are the building of dykes, the changing of
crop types, and vaccinations.
To understand the issue of climate change, Integrated Assessment Models (IAMS)
have been developed that integrate the main causes and effects of climate change.
IAMs combine disciplines as to evaluate the whole cause and effect chain of climate
change. In such a manner the effects of the economy on climate change and the
effects of climate change on the economy are linked. The advantage of IAMS is that
they can deal with important issues such as the efficient allocation of abatement
burdens and accepted damages, by specifying the costs and benefits of various
abatement strategies, using a detailed description of both economic and environmen-
tal developments. IAMS, therefore, can analyse what the optimal climate strategy
should be. Up to now, however, IAMS focus on the trade-off between damages due
to climate change and mitigation costs and ignore the option of adaptation or at best
treat it implicitly as part of the damage estimate.1 Tol and Fankhauser (1998) survey
the IAM literature and conclude that in the majority of the models adaptation is not
included; this situation has hardly improved since then. Furthermore, mostly when
adaptation was included in a model, only induced adaptation and implicit adaptation
were considered. Induced adaptation refers to the process of readjustment to the
new climate and it represented through transition costs and transition time. Implicit
adaptation refers to where adaptation is considered within a relationship in the model
using certain assumptions. This is often in the form of the damage function assuming
optimal adaptation or no adaptation. Adaptation is then not a variable that can be
changed or studied, i.e. it is not explicit. Explicit adaptation refers to adaptation
1Examples of such models are: MERGE (Manne et al. 1995, 2005), FUND (Tol 2006) and IGSM
(Sokolov et al. 2005).
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being modelled as an endogenous choice variable that can be set at a specific level
or optimised. Including adaptation explicitly gives you the opportunity to study the
exact levels, costs, and effects of adaptation.
Because of the private nature of most adaptation, it is sometimes argued that
adaptation is not a decision variable for a region, as the adaptation decisions are
not in the hands of the leaders of that region (Tol 2005). However, besides the fact
that many forms of adaptation are public, private adaptation is still a decision taken
in a region, even if not by the leaders of that region. One may also argue that, under
certain assumptions, the socially optimal adaptation (as calculated below) coincides
with the adaptation provided by the market. This, however, is unlikely as the public
lacks information on the effects of climate change and adaptation options, and adap-
tation often entails big scale projects that the market cannot provide. Studies have
shown that the effects of adaptation can be enormous, decreasing gross damages
by up to 80% (Mendelsohn 2000). Therefore, to fully understand the effects of cli-
mate change and climate change policies adaptation also needs to be considered and
modelled as a policy variable.
In this paper, we include adaptation as a policy variable in an IAM, namely the
Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (DICE), which was origi-
nally developed by Nordhaus (1994) and elaborated in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).
The DICE model is a global model and includes economic growth functions as well as
geophysical functions. The use of adaptation is assumed to be optimal and is already
included in the damage function. We develop what we have named the Adaptation
in DICE (AD-DICE) model that includes adaptation as a decision variable.
Estimates from empirical literature on the costs and benefits of adaptation are
used to calibrate the model and derive the adaptation cost curve that is implicit in
the DICE model. We then construct new policy scenarios with no adaptation to
understand the effects of adaptation. We take a closer look at the effects of adap-
tation and mitigation on each other.
This paper is structured as follows; in the next section the literature on adaptation
in IAMs is reviewed. Section 3 lays out the AD-DICE model and its theoretical
framework. In Section 4 the details of the calibration are described and the para-
meter values of the AD-DICE model are given. Section 5 presents the results with
an analysis of the different policy options and the interactions of mitigation and
adaptation. In Section 6 a sensitivity analysis is done. Finally we conclude and make
a few suggestions for further research.
2 Literature review
There have been many articles calling for more research on adaptation, especially in
the modelling context. Tol and Fankhauser (1998) specifically call for the introduc-
tion of explicit adaptation in IAMS. They survey 20 IAMS and find that adaptation
is distinguished only in very few of the models. Furthermore, they find only one
model, the Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE) model (Hope et al.
1993; Plambeck et al. 1997), where adaptation is considered as a policy variable for
all impact sectors. Since Tol and Fankhauser (1998), nothing has really changed with
regard to the inclusion of adaptation in IAMS. This is confirmed by a recent review of
various sorts of adaptation models by Dickinson (2007). Some important theoretical
work has been developed simultaneously to our analysis (Lecocq and Shalizi 2007).
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Hope et al. (1993) investigate two adaptation policy choices in the PAGE model,
namely no adaptation and aggressive adaptation. Aggressive adaptation decreases
initial climate change impacts by up to 90%. Hope et al. (1993) say that this reduc-
tion will cost 0.5 trillion Euros and decrease impacts by 17.5 trillion Euros. These
estimates do not seem realistic and contradict existing empirical literature on the
costs and effects of adaptation (Reilly et al. 1994; Parry et al. 1998a, b; Fankhauser
1998; Mendelsohn 2000). The benefits of adaptation estimated by Hope et al. (1993)
are much higher than is found in this literature. Not surprisingly, Hope et al. (1993)
find that an aggressive adaptation policy is beneficial and should be implemented. It
should be noted that the authors of this article also call for incorporating improved
information on adaptation in their model. Hope et al. (1993) model adaptation such
that it decreases the “tolerable” rate of climate change, the “tolerable” absolute
climate change and the impacts beyond these “tolerable” amounts. Although Hope
et al. (1993) take a step in considering adaptation and how it may be implemented
into IAMS; the values used are very unrealistic and teach us little about dynamics
of adaptation or the trade-offs with mitigation. Furthermore, adaptation is not a
continuous choice, but a discrete variable; and it is a scenario variable rather than a
choice variable. Later versions of the PAGE model have been developed, however,
the same specification of adaptation were used (Hope 2006).
A more recent and detailed paper where adaptation is explicitly modelled is that
of Tol (2007). This model only considers sea level rise and coastal protection. It
models protection as a continuous decision variable, based on Fankhauser (1994),
and gives insights into adaptation dynamics. Tol (2007) shows that protection is a very
important option to combat the impacts of sea level rise. Furthermore mitigation and
adaptation need to be traded off as more mitigation will lead to less free resources
for adaptation. Tol and Dowlatabadi (2001) did a similar analysis looking at vector-
borne diseases, focusing on malaria. They find that overly ambitious mitigation could
increase the adverse impacts of climate change due a decrease in adaptive capacity.
Previous papers have taken the first steps to explicitly including adaptation in
IAMS, but clearly do not exhaust the potential. Adaptation is an important policy
option that needs to be included in IAM analyses for all climate change damages.
This article adds to the IAM and climate change literature by doing that.
3 A framework with explicit adaptation decisions
In the DICE model, utility is maximized. Utility is calculated as the discounted natu-
ral logarithm of consumption. In each time period, consumption and savings/
investment are endogenously chosen subject to available income reduced by the
costs of climate change (residual damages, mitigation costs and protection costs).
The climate change damages are represented by a damage function that depends on
the temperature increase compared to 1900 levels.
Adaptation to climate change would decrease the initial damages of climate
change. This is the mechanism we add to the DICE model. We define gross damages
as the initial damages by climate change if no changes were to be made in ecological,
social and economic systems. If these systems were to change to limit climate change
damages (i.e. adapt) the damages would decrease. We refer to these “left-over”
damages as residual damages. Reducing gross damages, however, comes at a cost,
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i.e. we need to invest resources in adaptation. These costs are referred to as protec-
tion costs or adaptation costs. Thus, the net damages in DICE are the total of the
residual damages and the protection costs.
In the DICE model the net damage function is a combination of the optimal mix
of protection costs and residual damages.2 Thus the net damage function given in
DICE can be unravelled into residual damages and protection costs. We do this as
follows. The original damage function in DICE is given as
Dt
Yt
= a1TEt + a2TE2t , (1)
where Dt represents the net damages, Yt the output and TEt the temperature change
compared to the 1900 temperature. We split the net damages into residual damages
(RDt) and protection costs (PCt).
Dt
Yt
= RDt (GDt, Pt)
Yt
+ PCt (Pt)
Yt
(2)
Here we assume that the protection costs and the residual damages are separable,
and can be represented as a fraction of income. They both depend on protection (Pt)
but the costs are independent of each other. Residual damages depend on both the
gross damages (GDt) and the level of protection (Pt). Effectively, this makes the
decisions on the levels of protection and mitigation separable.
We assume that the gross damage function takes the form given in:
GDt
Yt
= α1TEt + α2TEα3t , where α2 > 0 and α3 > 1. (3)
This is the most commonly used form for damage costs of climate change in IAMS,
where α3 generally takes a value between 1 and 3 (Tol and Fankhauser 1998). This is
also the same form as used in the DICE model, however, α3 is not assumed to be 2
as in the DICE model, but is left to be determined through calibration.
We use the following function to express RDt as a function of Pt and GDt;3
RDt = GDt × (1 − Pt) , where 0 ≤ Pt ≤ 1. (4)
The main advantage of using the form given in Eq. 4 is that P has an intuitive
interpretation. Protection is then given on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 represents
no protection: none of the gross climate change damages are decreased through
protection. A value of 1 would mean that all gross climate change damages are
avoided through adaptation. Thus, P gives the fraction by which gross damages are
reduced: Pt = GDt−RDtGDt .
Protection costs are given as a function of the level of protection. We assume
that this function is growing at an increasing rate, as cheaper and more effective
2According to Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), adaptation is included in the damage estimates and it is
implicitly assumed that this is the optimal adaptation.
3In line with DICE99 online version used in this analysis, we assume that net climate change damages
are strictly non-negative, that is climate change will have a negative effect. Note that this may not
be the case for several regions of the world (e.g. Tol 2002) and in other models such as the DICE99
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) version.
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adaptation options will be applied first, and more expensive and less effective options
will be used after these, thus
∂PCt
∂ Pt
> 0 and
∂2PCt
∂ P2t
> 0.
There are many types of functions that fit these criteria. We assume this function
takes the form of a power function4
PCt
Yt
= γ1 Pγ2t , where γ1 > 0 and γ2 > 1. (5)
We assume that the level of protection is chosen every time period (10 years).
The protection in one time period does not affect damages in the next period,
thus each decade the same problem is faced, and the same trade-off holds. This
implies that both the costs and benefits of adaptation are “instantaneous”, i.e. they
fall within the same time period, that is within the same decade. The important
implication of this assumption is that as long as adaptation is applied optimally,
the benefits of adaptation will always outweigh the costs (this follows directly from
the maximisation) and hence the adaptation decision will never draw away funds
from mitigation policy. Although this way of modelling adaptation benefits and
costs is debatable, many adaptation measures have this characteristic. Examples
of such adaptation measures are applying sunblock, switching on air conditioning,
changing holiday destinations and changing crop types. Other adaptation measures,
especially in the category of anticipatory adaptation, however, have a time-lag in
costs and benefits. Example of such measures are building seawalls and early warning
systems. An analysis which adds an adaptation capital stock to represent anticipatory
adaptation would, however, be interesting and is deferred to future work.
Equation 5 gives us an adaptation cost curve. Combined with Eq. 4, it compares
the reduced damages (as a fraction of gross damages) with the costs of the adaptation
(as a fraction of output).
4 Calibration of the AD-DICE model
In our analysis we use the GAMS version of the DICE99 model as available online.5
It should be noted that a new version of this model DICE2007 has recently become
available. The newer version assumes decreasing abatement costs as opposed to
increasing assumed in DICE99. Furthermore the damages function is higher in the
newer version. de Bruin et al. (forthcoming) show that these improvements do not
essentially change our results, although they increase the importance of mitigation
compared to adaptation somewhat. We calibrate the AD-DICE model using the
optimal control scenario of DICE. We calibrate the model in such a way that it best
replicates the results of the original DICE model. To do this we constructed a model
that minimized the discounted squared difference between net damages (Dt) in the
4In the Appendix 1 another representation is presented and used to calibrate the AD-DICE model.
5This model was available on the homepage of William Nordhaus until spring 2006.
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Table 1 Parameter values from AD-DICE in the optimal scenario calibration
Parameter α1 α2 α3 γ1 γ2 p-value
Value 0.0012 0.0023 2.32 0.115 3.60 0.99
original DICE and net damages (RDt + PCt) in AD-DICE, holding TEt at the level
obtained in the DICE optimal control scenario.
We use additional information for the calibration of the parameters: α1, α2, α3,
γ 1 and γ 2. Firstly, the Pt chosen must be optimal. Thus for all Pt, ∂ Dt∂ Pt = 0 must
hold, or ∂RD
∂ P = ∂PC∂ P . Next, we have to identify a point on the protection cost curve
to be able to calibrate the function. We chose to calibrate on the same point as
used to calibrate the damages in the original DICE model: a doubling of CO2
concentrations. This is assumed to occur after 130 years (t = 13), this corresponds
in the DICE model to a temperature rise of 2.3◦C (TE = 2.3) compared to 1,900.
The second condition states that PC takes a value of 7–25% of total damages in the
calibration point. This condition is taken from an estimate by Tol et al. (1998), which
is based on an extensive review of impact assessment literature. We also restrict the
parameter P based on literature (Parry et al. 1998a; Reilly et al. 1994; Fankhauser
1998; Mendelsohn 2000) at a level between 0.3 and 0.8 at the calibration point.
Furthermore, according to Tol et al. (1998), PC should lie between 0.1% and 0.5%
of GDP at the calibration point; this restriction was also implemented.
Our AD-DICE model, when calibrated with these restrictions, is able to repro-
duce the damages of the DICE model well. To test the significance of our models we
regress the DICE damages on those of the AD-DICE and test the hypothesis that
they are equal using an F-test. The p-value, which may be interpreted as the chance
that they are indeed equal, is given in Table 1, along with the parameter estimates.
The very high p-value indicates that DICE and AD-DICE are almost identical.
Figure 1 depicts the net climate change costs estimated by AD-DICE and those
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Fig. 2 The adaptation cost curve implicit in the DICE model (range 0–0.45)
estimated by DICE, for both the optimal control scenario and for the scenario
without mitigation. For both scenarios, our calibration fits well with some small
diversions in later periods (the present value of these differences are negligible due
to the positive discount rate used). This shows that our parameter values are valid
for both scenarios.
As also can be seen in Fig. 1, the AD-DICE levels of mitigation replicate those
of DICE, albeit that the levels are slightly lower in later periods in AD-DICE.
Mitigation is essentially the same in DICE and AD-DICE. This is because the deci-
sions to mitigate and adapt are separable. In DICE, mitigation is set by the marginal
damage cost. In AD-DICE, mitigation is set by the marginal residual damage plus
adaptation cost. As the net damage profiles in DICE and AD-DICE are practically
identical, so are the marginals. Thus our model will give the same results as the DICE
model if we keep adaptation at its optimal level.
Using the parameter values found in AD-DICE we can draw an adaptation cost
curve, given in Fig. 2. We see that the protection costs of the first 15% of gross
damage reduction are extremely low after which they rise. The optimal level of
adaptation varies from 0.09 to 0.45, with an average of 0.33, that is 33% of gross
damages are reduced due to adaptation. It can easily be seen that the costs of adapta-
tion rise to such a high level that it can never be optimal to fully adapt to climate
change. That is solely adapting to climate change is not a solution and mitigation will
be needed too.
5 Results
In this section we present our results. We first look at how climate change costs
are composed. Then we compare different policy options. Finally we look at the
dynamics of adaptation and mitigation and how they affect each other.
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5.1 Costs of climate change and policy options
The costs of climate change include residual damages, protection costs and abate-
ment costs. In Fig. 3, we see that a large part of climate change costs consist of
residual damages in the optimal control scenario. Mitigation costs increase relatively
steeply over time.
Now we compare different policy options using the AD-DICE model. We take
two climate change policy scenarios created by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) as a
starting point. We revise these scenarios by including non-optimal adaptation. We
then compare the effects of the different scenarios on the basis of utility.
The two scenarios of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) are the no control baseline sce-
nario and the optimal control scenario. In the no control scenario, adaptation is
chosen at its optimal level, thus in such a way as to maximise utility, but the level
of mitigation is set at zero. In the optimal control scenario both adaptation and miti-
gation are chosen at their optimal levels. We use four scenarios in AD-DICE: optimal
control, no-control, only-adaptation and only-mitigation. Our optimal case is the
same as that of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). In our no-control scenario, adaptation
and mitigation levels are set at zero. In the only-adaptation scenario, the adaptation is
at its optimal level while the mitigation level is zero. In the only-mitigation scenario,
the mitigation is at its optimal level while the adaptation level is zero.
We first look at the utility of the different scenarios. Logically we see that the
optimal control leads to the highest welfare level, followed by the only adaptation
scenario. This is followed by the only-mitigation scenario. Finally the scenario that
creates the lowest utility is the no-control scenario. Thus only adapting results in
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Fig. 4 Climate change costs of different policy scenarios
a higher utility than only mitigating and adaptation is the preferred, single control
in this model. These results confirm the importance of adaptation. Note that this
conclusion may be specific to our model setting. Below, we report the results of a
sensitivity analysis that show that our conclusions are robust to a range of parameter
variations. More fundamental changes in model assumptions, however, may result in
a different conclusion.
In Fig. 4, we compare the distribution of costs of climate change over time with
the different policy scenarios. The different scenarios distribute the cost of climate
change quite differently over time. Thus changes in the discount rate will also change
the ranking of the scenarios.
We see that in the only-mitigation scenario damages in the last periods are much
smaller than in the no-control scenario. The only-adaptation scenario damages are
smaller in the beginning periods compared to the no-control scenario. The optimal
scenario distributes the damages more evenly over time. At certain points in time it
is less beneficial than a scenario with only adaptation, but overall this scenario has
the least discounted damages.
5.2 Mitigation and adaptation
There is increasing attention for the interactions between adaptation and mitiga-
tion (Klein et al. 2007). Extra investment in adaptation may decrease or increase
emissions, or mitigation may stimulate or hinder adaptation. An example of this
is increased use of air conditioning in the face of global warming, which increases
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emissions. This relation is surveyed in AR4 (Klein et al. 2007), they conclude that
the relationship between adaptation and mitigation is ambiguous and small. Here we
assume that adaptation and mitigation have no direct effects on each other.
Adaptation and mitigation are rival goods, as they compete for resources.
Increased mitigation (adaptation) will decrease the funds available for adaptation
(mitigation). This is explicitly included in our set-up, but is not particularly important
as the sum of money spent on either adaptation or mitigation is small relative to
the total budget. Furthermore, in the situation of optimal adaptation the immediate
benefits will always be higher than the costs and will therefore not deplete funds
for mitigation in this set-up. As mentioned in the model description, our model
specification ignores the sometimes considerable time-lags between the costs and
benefits of adaptation measures, and assumes that benefits will occur in the same
decade as the associated costs.
More importantly, we model adaptation and mitigation as policy substitutes. The
word substitute is used here in the economic sense of the word: more mitigation
(adaptation) reduces the need for adaptation (mitigation). In the optimal policy,
however, there is both adaptation and mitigation, as mitigation cannot avoid all
climate change, and adaptation cannot avoid all impacts.
To examine the dynamics of adaptation and mitigation in more detail, we look
at the net benefits of adaptation and mitigation over time (both as a percentage of
output) in Fig. 5. We see that adaptation has higher benefits until 2140 than does
mitigation. After that, however, mitigation becomes much more beneficial than adap-
tation. Thus even though it is optimal to invest in mitigation, few of these benefits will
be felt in the first 60 years—largely because of the slow workings of the carbon cycle
and climate.
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Furthermore, we look at how adaptation and mitigation affect each other. In
Fig. 5, the net benefits of mitigation are given for the case when only mitigation is
an option and for the case where adaptation is also possible. We see that including
adaptation as an option increases the benefits of the optimal path of mitigation until
2120 but decrease the benefits later. This is because adding adaptation as a control
option will decrease the optimal level of mitigation. Because of this, costs of miti-
gation in the beginning periods will be avoided but this also entails that benefits
of mitigation in later periods are lost. In this case, over-investment in mitigation in
earlier periods is unnecessary because the option of adaptation is available. That is,
adaptation is a more effective short-term tool, which can be applied instead of the
less effective long-term tool of mitigation. In later periods, adaptation decreases the
effectiveness of mitigation in reducing impacts. As more is invested in adaptation,
the less effective mitigation will become. The other way around more adapta-
tion decreases residual damages compared to gross damages making mitigation less
effective.
There is a chance that policymakers do not look at the optimal control over
time but only consider the near future that is the world has a myopic view. In this
case because the benefits of adaptation are higher in earlier years, there may be
an overinvestment in adaptation and an underinvestment in mitigation. This is a
problem of inter generational externalities, that is the burdens of mitigation are felt
in earlier periods, while the benefits are reaped in later periods (or more accurately
the benefits of a high level of consumption are reaped now, while the burdens are felt
by later generations in the form of climate change damages). However, a side benefit
in this respect is that the net damages of the optimal level of mitigation in the earlier
periods are lower and even become benefits when adaptation is included as a control
option.
We see that mitigation only has a “negative” effect on adaptation. In Fig. 5
we see that adaptation is less beneficial when mitigation is also an option. This
is because mitigation reduces gross damages reducing the potential benefits of
adaptation. The difference between benefits of adaptation with optimal mitigation
and without mitigation increases over time, because the effect of mitigation becomes
more pronounced over time. It is important to note that even though mitigation and
adaptation decrease each others effectiveness, i.e. there is a negative interaction
effect; the simultaneous use of both options is still optimal. The marginal costs
of both options increase more than proportionately with higher percentages of
mitigation/adaptation, and this effect is stronger than the interaction effect, and
the optimal policy involves a mixture of moderate amounts of both adaptation and
mitigation.
6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we conduct a sensitivity analysis. We have already seen that our model
is robust to changes in the scenario used in the calibration, see Fig. 1. AD-DICE
replicates DICE in all scenarios where adaptation is optimal and does not need to be
recalibrated for different scenarios. Next we check if our model is robust to changes
in the climate sensitivity and the discount rate used.
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6.1 Discount rate
We run both the DICE and AD-DICE model with three alternative utility discount
rates, namely a low level, an original, middle level and a high level. The original
discount rate is 0.03 and decreases over time, the low level discount rate is 50% of
the original level (0.015) and the high level is 150% of the original level (0.045). We
see that the AD-DICE model adjusts to changes in the discount rate in the same way
as the DICE for all relevant variables. We find that the AD-DICE model has slightly
lower levels of mitigation but replicates the DICE model very well. Thus without
recalibration the model is still valid here.
We know from the DICE model that a higher (lower) discount rate decreases
(increases) the level of mitigation. In Fig. 6 we see that in the AD-DICE model a
higher (lower) discount increases (decreases) the level of adaptation. This is quite
intuitive as the benefits of mitigation are only felt in later periods, while the costs
are felt in earlier periods. A higher (lower) discount rate would shift policy from
mitigation (adaptation) to adaptation (mitigation).
6.2 Climate sensitivity
We do the same with three levels of climate sensitivity i.e. the equilibrium warming
for a doubling of the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide. The original
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Fig. 7 Adaptation level with different climate sensitivities
climate-equation coefficient, that is the effect of radiative forcing on the atmospheric
temperature, is 0.226. This is equivalent to assuming a thermal capacity of the upper
ocean layer of 0.0226 W yrK m2 (cf. Füssel 2007). The low level coefficient is 50% of the
original level (0.113) and the high level is 150% of the original level (0.339). Again
we see that AD-DICE adjusts in the same manner as DICE with lower mitigation
levels in later periods.
Lower (higher) climate sensitivity will decrease (increase) mitigation. In Fig. 7 we
see that lower (higher) climate sensitivity will decrease (increase) adaptation until
the year 2190 and increase (decrease) it after that. This is because if emissions cause
less climate change, there will be lower damages. This will lead to lower levels of miti-
gation and adaptation. After some time due to the lower level of mitigation, damages
will reach a level where a high level of adaptation will again become optimal.
The main point here is that our model replicates the DICE model with varying
parameters without recalibration. That is, the analysis of mitigation policies in
AD-DICE does not differ substantially from the analysis in DICE, even though the
AD-DICE adaptation equations are only calibrated to one DICE scenario.
6.3 Protection costs
Finally we look at the results if we use another specification for the protection costs
function. We give the PCt function as
PCt
Yt
= γ1
(
1
1 − Pt
)γ2
, where γ1 > 0 and γ2 > 1. (6)
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Fig. 8 Climate change costs of different scenarios with second PCt specification
This full analysis is given in the Appendix 1; here we discuss the results only. The
adaptation curves of both specifications are not identical, see Fig. 9 in Appendix 1.
Using the alternative specification leads to a higher lying adaptation cost curve that
translates into higher protection costs. The curve also becomes very steep at P = 0.3
with extremely high costs at adaptation levels above that.
We again look at the policy scenarios with the new specification. The results show
the same order of policies; however, the utility of the scenarios with no adaptation
are slightly higher than before.
We also check to see whether the costs of climate change under the different
control options develop in the same way as before and if the results are not sensitive
to changes in specifications. In Fig. 8, we present the climate cost curves of the
different options using the new protection cost function. We compare Fig. 8 with
the corresponding results of the original protection cost function given in Fig. 4.
The curves have the same form in both figures. Because the adaptation cost curve is
slightly higher in this specification (see Fig. 9), the no control curve is slightly lower
than before. We thus can conclude that our results on the policy options are robust
to these changes.
Adaptation and mitigation are still affected by each other in the same way as
in the original PCt specification. Adaptation increases the benefits of mitigation in
earlier periods and decreases them in later periods. Mitigation decreases the benefits
of adaptation. This is not affected by our specification of the adaptation equations in
AD-DICE.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we set up a framework that can model adaptation as a decision variable
in IAMS that include a climate change damage module with monetised damages.
We use this framework to create the model AD-DICE that includes adaptation as
a decision variable in the DICE model of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). In the DICE
model, adaptation is assumed to be optimal and implicit in the damage function.
We adopt a framework in which adaptation and mitigation decisions are separa-
ble: the adaptation level is chosen to minimise net damages plus adaptation costs,
while the mitigation level is chosen to minimise the aggregate of net damages and
adaptation costs plus mitigation costs. AD-DICE is calibrated to mimic the original
DICE model for the optimal control scenario and the best-guess parameters. Without
recalibration, our model also replicates the mitigation results of the DICE model
under different scenarios and parameter values. This means that making adaptation
explicit and setting it at an optimal level yields the same results as implicit optimal
adaptation. While this is obvious for the calibrated scenario, the fact that mitigation
results in DICE are not affected by the implicit representation of adaptation implies
that explicit treatment of adaptation does not alter the results concerning the eco-
nomic impacts of mitigation policies. Thus we tentatively conclude that while adap-
tation may not be explicitly represented in most existing Integrated Assessment
Models, there are no grounds to reject the mitigation policy conclusions from these
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models for the reason that they do not explicitly include adaptation. That is, while
these models cannot be used to investigate optimal adaptation strategies, there are
not necessarily biased in their analysis of mitigation strategies.
Our results show that both adaptation and mitigation can substantially reduce
the impacts of climate change. When applied optimally, adaptation will reduce gross
damages of climate change by on average 33% (as calibrated). We see that applying
only adaptation is more beneficial than applying only mitigation, illustrating the
importance of adaptation as a control option in combating climate change, especially
in the short run. We also conclude that adaptation is the main climate change cost
reducer in the first periods (up to the year 2100) after which mitigation reduces the
bulk of the damages. Thus to combat climate change in the efficient way, the short
term optimal policy consists of a mixture of adaptation measures and investments in
mitigation, even though the latter will only decrease damages in later periods.
To challenge the conclusions from AD-DICE, more research is needed. Firstly, we
ignore uncertainty. However, the way we calibrated the gross damage and adaptation
functions makes them respond in the same way to key parameter variations as
the original DICE model. This suggests that the behaviour of AD-DICE would be
similar to that of DICE, also under uncertainty. Secondly, we ignore irreversibility.
Should greenhouse gas emissions set in motion a shutdown of the thermohaline
circulation or a collapse of the Greenland or West-Antarctic Ice Sheet, adaptation
may be the only policy option. Thirdly, we assume perfect markets. We use an aggre-
gate impact function, rather than making a distinction between different sectors. In
some sectors, adaptation is relatively easy. In other sectors, it is more difficult. More
detailed modelling of adaptation would also allow for a distinction between transition
costs and equilibrium costs. Fourthly, we use a single region model. Like sectors,
different countries may have a qualitatively different response to climate change, and
adaptation may be very different. Furthermore, with different countries, countries
may cooperate on mitigation, on adaptation, or both—while the original DICE
model has only one instrument of international cooperation. Finally, adaptation
may not be applied optimally but still applied to a certain extent. Therefore further
research into non-optimal adaptation scenarios is warranted. All this is deferred to
future work, which can build upon the framework developed in this paper.
Appendix 1: an alternative specification of the adaptation cost function
In this Appendix 1 we show the calibration of the AD-DICE model using another
specification of the PCt function. This specification is based on the idea that the RDt
function takes another form, i.e.
RDt = GDtPRt , where PRt > 1. (7)
Table 2 Parameter values from AD-DICE using the PC(1/(1 − P)) specification
Scenario α1 α2 α3 γ 1 γ 2 p-value
Optimal 0.00058 0.0027 2.20 0.000082 8.19 0.99
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The level of protection is given by PRt. Thus, instead of assuming that protection
directly reduces gross damages on a one-to-one basis, we assume that adaptation
becomes less effective as the level of adaptation rises. The costs of this protection we
assume to be given by a power function:
PCt
Yt
= γ1PRγ2t , where γ1 > 0 and γ2 > 1. (8)
To be able to use the logical interpretation of Pt and to thus keep the original RDt
function (3), we rewrite Eq. 8 as a function of Pt, this results in the following PCt
function:
PCt
Yt
= γ1
(
1
1 − Pt
)γ2
, where γ1 > 0 and γ2 > 1. (9)
The results of the calibration with this specification are given in Table 2. In Fig. 9 the
adaptation curves under both specifications are given.
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